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Establishing a high-quality internal control system has long been viewed as an important mechanism to ensure high-quality
ﬁnancial reporting. Prior studies show that weak internal control can increase the probability of material errors and false ﬁnancial
disclosures (Bell & Carcello, 2000; Kinney & McDaniel, 1989); it can also increase the probability of a ﬁrm restating its earnings
(Bizarro, Boudreaux, & Garcia, 2011), as weak internal control creates more opportunities for intentional earnings management
and unintentional accounting estimation errors (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2009; Doyle, Ge, & McVay, 2007).
In July 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in response to numerous corporate failures and accounting
scandals (Altamuro & Beatty, 2010). The most important aspect of SOX is its requirement of the management and the auditor to
evaluate internal control on ﬁnancial reporting (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB], 2004; Securities and
Exchange Commission [SEC], 2003). While the effectiveness of such regulation on internal control is still debated and remains
controversial (Bedard, 2011; Costello & Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011; Doyle et al., 2007; Rice & Weber, 2012), some countries
have followed the U.S. lead, introducing internal control reporting (ICR) with a softer approach (Cox, 2006). For example, Japan
has implemented an internal reporting system with less strict requirements for all listed ﬁrms from 2008 (Nishizaki, Takano, &
Takeda, 2014). Other countries, such as the UK and other European Union member states, have adopted a broad approach
(Deumes & Knechel, 2008) that encompasses a wider scope of internal control systems in relation to the whole management.lu@monash.edu (W. Lu), wen.qu@deakin.edu.au (W. Qu).
ved.
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dard hereafter) was jointly issued by ﬁve regulatory authorities in China, including the Ministry of Finance (MOF, 2008), the China
Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the National Auditing Ofﬁce (NAO), the China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC), and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). Three supporting guidelines for implementing the Basic Standard
were further issued in 2010. The Basic Standard and guidelines require Chinese listed ﬁrms to provide a management evaluation
report on the effectiveness of their internal control as well as an auditor's assessment of the effectiveness of clients' internal con-
trol. In an ICR, the Chinese listed ﬁrm needs to disclose whether an internal control weakness (ICW) is minor, major, or serious;
the ICR also includes a remedial plan for its ICWs. However, these regulations became mandatory only from January 1, 2012. Prior
to this date, ﬁrms could choose to voluntarily comply with internal control regulations (MOF, 2010a,b,c).
Prior studies suggest a consistent and negative relationship between disclosure of ICWs and earnings quality in Western
countries (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2008; Chan, Farrell, & Lee, 2008; Doyle et al., 2007; Lu, Richardson, &
Salterio, 2011). Our study differs from prior studies in several aspects. First, China has a different ﬁnancial reporting environment
in comparison with Western countries. Chinese listed ﬁrms exhibit a strong presence of state ownership, heavy political inﬂuence,
and weak corporate governance mechanisms (Chen & Yuan, 2004; Liu & Lu, 2007; Liu & Sun, 2005). Therefore, research ﬁndings
for Western markets may not necessarily be applicable to the implementation of the Basic Standard in China. Second, in the
United States, SOX focuses particularly on the internal control system related to ﬁnancial reporting; China's Basic Standard is,
however, more comprehensive and extends the scope of the internal control system to a much broader scope of business
management. The Internal Control Application Guidelines identify 18 internal control areas that listed ﬁrms in China must
strengthen, from organizational structure, human resource management, budget, and corporate social responsibility to
procurement and sales activities, outsourcing, and contract management. Internal control directly related to the preparation of
ﬁnancial reporting is only one of the components of the overall internal control system articulated in the Basic Standard. It is
therefore important to investigate the association between earnings quality and ICWs in relation to the broader internal control
system in China, in contrast to the narrow disclosure scope of ICWs in the U.S. In our study, we partition all ICWs into two
categories: accounting-related ICWs versus non-accounting-related ICWs. We then examine the association between earnings
quality and voluntary disclosure of each category of ICW. Third, U.S. SOX–focused studies are conducted in a mandatory disclosure
regime, while the institutional setting of this study is voluntary. Fourth, we investigate not only the impact of the existence of
ICWs on earnings quality but also the impact of the severity of ICWs on earnings quality. Our research is a signiﬁcant extension
of earlier studies. Doyle et al. (2007) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) use a dummy variable to measure whether a ﬁrm has
ICWs and then compare the earnings quality between ﬁrms with and without ICWs, whereas, Lu et al. (2011) examine the
relationship between accrual quality and the number of ICWs disclosed. We use both a dummy variable and a continuous variable
to measure the existence and the severity of ICWs. Then, we investigate whether earnings quality is signiﬁcantly different
between ﬁrms with and without ICWs, and whether the severity of ICWs affects earnings quality.
This study has two goals. First, to investigate the relationship between voluntary disclosure of ICWs and earnings quality in
Chinese listed ﬁrms in the period 2010–2011, the period in which listed ﬁrms could voluntarily release ICRs.1
Second, this study investigates whether a much broader internal control standard, which extends from accounting-related to
non-accounting-related internal control, has any impact on earnings quality. We hand-collected the ICW data from 1059 Chinese
listed ﬁrms that voluntarily provided ICRs in 2010 and 2011. Following prior studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Chan et al.,
2008; Doyle et al., 2007), we use absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) as a measure of earnings quality.
Our results show that earnings quality is signiﬁcantly associated with ICWs disclosed by Chinese listed ﬁrms. ABSDA is
positively related to disclosure of ICWs, meaning that ﬁrms with ICWs are more likely to be engaged in earnings management
through use of discretionary accruals. With respect to different types of weaknesses, our results demonstrate that earnings quality
is signiﬁcantly associated with disclosure of both accounting-related and non-accounting-related ICWs.
In summary, we ﬁnd that voluntary disclosure of ICWs by Chinese listed ﬁrms provides additional and useful information to
users, enabling them to reassess their economic decisions. Our study makes signiﬁcant contributions to the existing literature
on internal control as well as earnings quality and holds practical implications for policy-making in China and around the
world. First, prior studies show a negative association between disclosure of ICWs and earnings quality in the SOX 302 and
404 regimes (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2008; Doyle et al., 2007). These results, however, are limited only to
the context of the internal control system with particular emphasis on ﬁnancial reporting. It is not clear whether ICWs other
than those in ﬁnancial reporting have any impact on earnings quality. Given that ﬁnancial reporting is an integrated component
of business operations and that the quality of ﬁnancial disclosure is affected by all aspects of business management, our results
suggest that a wider scope of disclosure of ICWs, including both accounting-related and non-accounting-related ICWs, does affect
earnings quality. This is consistent with the view that different elements of internal control need to function together in order to
minimize enterprise risks. This ﬁnding has profound policy implications for regulators worldwide who are considering whether
the SOX requirement should be expanded to non-accounting-related areas. Second, our study is the ﬁrst in the internal control
literature to investigate the relationship between the severity of ICWs disclosed and earnings quality in an emerging stock market,
which has different institutional attributes from those in developed markets. Our results enrich the internal control literature by1 Li, Tian, and Qi (2012) examine the relationship between auditor's unqualiﬁed opinions on internal controls (ARIC) and accrual quality. They use the overall auditor
assessment of effectiveness of internal control (dummy variable) but not the presence of ICWs as a testing variable. They did not detect a signiﬁcant difference in terms
of earnings quality between ARIC and non-ARIC ﬁrms. Our paper is the ﬁrst to directly investigate the impact of voluntary disclosure of ICWs on earnings quality in the
Chinese context.
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assist regulators and professional bodies in China and worldwide to predict and comprehend the likely effects of implementing
internal control regulations such as the Basic Standard in their own environment.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Development of the internal control regulatory framework in China is
discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents a literature review and hypothesis development, followed by an outline of the research
design in Section 4. Section 5 discusses sample selection and descriptive statistics. Empirical results are presented and discussed in
Section 6. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 7, which also addresses research limitations and considerations for future
research.
2. Development of the internal control regulatory framework in China
Well aware of listed ﬁrms' deﬁciencies in internal control, regulators in China have determined to establish a comprehensive
internal control regulatory framework. In June 2005, the MOF and CSRC jointly presented their report, Improving Internal Control
System in China by Referring to the U.S. SOX, to the State Council, aiming to obtain approval and support from the state to develop a
set of internal control standards and guidelines for Chinese listed ﬁrms. Four months later, CSRC issued Advice on the Improvement
of Internal Control System in Listed Firms. Actively responding to the CSRC's initiatives, in June 2006, the Shanghai Stock Exchange
issued internal control guidelines for the ﬁrms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
introduced similar guidelines in September 2006.
In 2008, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) released the Basic Standard jointly with the other four regulatory authorities in China
(MOF, 2008). The aim of this standard is to ensure legal compliance of management and safeguarding of assets, improve
operational efﬁciency and effectiveness, promote the development of corporate strategies, and provide comprehensive and
transparent ﬁnancial information. The Basic Standard states that an effective internal control system should encompass ﬁve
elements: internal control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and internal auditing;
this is very similar to the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) framework.2 The overall principle of the Basic Standard
states that the aim of establishing internal control regulations among Chinese enterprises is to strengthen enterprise management
skills and their ability for risk control, in order to promote sustainable development of enterprises and safeguard the socialist
market economy and public interests of society (MOF, 2008). The basic standard requires enterprises to continuously collect
relevant information to assess potential risks that could hinder business development and to establish a professional team for
making strategic policies to cope with both internal and external risks.3 The Basic Standard highlights that “risk management”
should be an ongoing and sustainable process.
Two years after issuing the basic standard, the ﬁve regulatory authorities issued the Internal Control Application Guidelines, the
Internal Control Evaluation Guidelines, and the Internal Control Audit Guidelines as a set of implementing guidelines. The Basic
Standard and guidelines require the management of listed ﬁrms to report a management evaluation on the effectiveness of
their internal control as well as provide the auditor's assessment on the effectiveness of the client's internal control system.
These regulations became mandatory only from January 1, 2012. Prior to 2012, ﬁrms could elect to voluntarily provide ICRs
and have them audited. The Internal Control Application Guidelines explicitly stipulate 18 speciﬁc areas in which internal control
needs to be effectively implemented (for details of the 18 areas, please see Table 2, Panel B). Depending on whether the 18 in-
ternal control areas have any direct impact on ﬁnancial reporting, the areas are divided into two categories: accounting-related
internal control areas and non-accounting-related internal control areas. The Internal Control Application Guidelines state that
the purpose of strengthening internal control is to reduce the potential risks. The Internal Control Evaluation Guidelines require
management to conduct a self-evaluation on the effectiveness of internal control over the 18 speciﬁc areas, concerning the ﬁve
aspects stipulated in the Basic Standard. It also requires management, in its self-evaluation, to classify the severity of ICWs into
three levels: minor, major, and serious. This regulation also addresses the importance of identifying ICWs and the procedure
for issuing an internal control evaluation report. The Internal Control Audit Guidelines specify the risk audit procedures and require
auditors to assess clients' business risks and risk management strategies.
3. Literature review and hypothesis development
Business entities all face uncertainties that present both risks and opportunities, with the potential to affect stakeholder value
(COSO, 2004). The uncertainties confronted by ﬁrms come in a wide array of forms, from the threat of acquisitions by predators
sweeping many industries as ﬁrms strive to build scale, to regulatory intervention that can adversely impact companies across
industries or take a toll on a speciﬁc industry (Pellet, 2007).4 These enterprise risks must be timely assessed, effectively controlled,2 The COSO framework, Internal Control-Integrated Framework, developed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission, is a
widely used framework not only in the United States but also around theworld. The original frameworkwas produced in 1992 andwas recently revised in 2013 (COSO,
2013; McNally, 2013).
3 The internal risks could be related to the ethics and integrity of the board of directors and senior management, the competence of employees, asset management,
information technology, and safety of the workplace. External risks can be associated with competition, regulatory intervention, natural disasters, etc. (MOF, 2008).
4 The Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS) classiﬁes enterprise risks into four categories, namely, hazard risk (e.g. liability torts, property damage, and natural catastro-
phes), ﬁnancial risk (e.g. pricing risk, asset risk, currency risk, and liquidity risk), operational risk (e.g. customer satisfaction, product failure, integrity, and reputational
risk; internal poaching and knowledge drain), and strategic risks (e.g. competition, social trend, and capital availability) (CAS, 2003). This classiﬁcation shows that en-
terprise risks can be either internally derived or externally imposed.
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stakeholder value. According to the Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework, a document also issued by the COSO in
2004 (COSO Risk Framework hereafter), ERM is “… a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and other
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of the entity's objectives.” The
COSO Risk Framework deﬁnition explicitly indicates that identifying and mitigating enterprise risk is a critical element of
managerial strategy and is therefore a crucial measure for ﬁrms to achieve their performance and proﬁtability targets and prevent
loss of resources (COSO, 2004).
The principles of risk management, as highlighted by the COSO Framework, are the assessment and monitoring of (1) risks to
achieving the entity's objectives, (2) the risk of potential fraud, and (3) business changes that could signiﬁcantly impact the
internal control and risk management system. COSO (2004) contends that effectiveness in risk management can only be achieved
if internal control is encompassed into enterprise risk management, forming a more robust conceptualization and tool for
management. According to COSO's Internal Control – Integrated Framework (COSO Internal Control Framework hereafter),
business entities need to have ﬁve internal control elements functioning together: control environment, risk management, control
activities, information and communication, and internal monitoring.5
Prior studies reveal a positive relationship between ﬁrms' risk controls and the quality of ﬁnancial reporting (Brown, Pott, &
Wömpener, 2014; Kinney, Maher, & Wright, 1990). Kinney et al. (1990) suggest that strong business risk control reduces the
chance of false or misleading reporting due to unexpected deviations in operational and strategic plans. Brown et al. (2014)
suggest that four speciﬁc channels of the compliance with internal control and risk management (ICRM) can improve earnings
quality in Germany:
First, the implementation of high quality internal control and risk management can curb insiders' opportunities and incentive
to intentionally misstate or misrepresent reported income. Second, compliance with ICRM can reduce the effects of unintentional
omissions and procedural errors on reported information. Third, risk assessment and monitoring can mitigate inherent business
risks and the direct and indirect impact of these risks on ﬁrms' reporting choices and the transparency of ﬁnancial reports. Lastly,
ICRM audit and reporting obligation can improve the transparency and information ﬂow regarding ICRM quality among the
management and supervisory boards and external auditors, which in turn, can mitigate the negative effect of ICRM weaknesses
on accounting quality. (pp. 9–10)
Consistent with their expectation, Brown et al. (2014) ﬁnd that German ﬁrms experience an increase in timely loss recognition
and a decrease in loss avoidance behaviour after the ICRM reform. In summary, high-quality internal control has been considered
an effective risk management tool in achieving a ﬁrm's performance and proﬁtability targets, preventing the loss of resources and
enhancing the reliability of ﬁnancial reporting.3.1. Voluntary disclosure of internal control weaknesses and earnings quality
ICWs represent the deﬁciency present in the internal control system, and accordingly, have the potential to impair a ﬁrm's
ability to achieve its desired goals. Thus, the disclosure of ICWs to stakeholders reveals the presence of internal control deﬁciency
and the level of the severity of such deﬁciency, which is perceived as ‘bad’ news for stakeholders. Why, then, do ﬁrms voluntarily
disclose ‘bad’ news? The reason is that ﬁrms believe that the beneﬁts of disclosure of ICWs outweigh the costs.6 McMullen,
Rahunandan, and Rama (1996) argue that the voluntary release of management reports on internal control (MRIC) can lead to
enhanced internal controls in two ways. First, the process of preparing and releasing MRIC can increase awareness among the
CEO and other top ofﬁcials on the importance of internal control, preventing serious internal control problems from occurring.
Second, the issuing of MRIC “sends a signal regarding top management's commitment to internal control” (McMullen et al., 1996,
p.68).
Therefore, disclosure of ICWs has a signaling effect. Voluntary disclosure of ICWs demonstrates that a ﬁrm's management has
established a strong awareness of the importance of internal control and is committed to identifying and closing loopholes
affecting ﬁrm performance and the quality of ﬁnancial information.
Prior studies ﬁnd that earnings quality, measured by ABSDA, is closely associated with a ﬁrm's internal control quality
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2008; Doyle et al., 2007; Lu et al., 2011). Focusing on the U.S. market in the SOX
302 and 404 regimes, Doyle et al. (2007) suggest that a weak internal control environment has the potential to allow
management to make intentionally biased accruals and to make unintentional errors in accrual estimation. Ashbaugh-Skaife et
al. (2008) investigate the effect of internal control deﬁciencies and their remediation on accrual quality under both the settings5 Control environment lays the foundation for a business entity's internal control, setting the tone of the “culture of control” for the entity. Management and em-
ployees' integrity, ethical values, competence, philosophy, and operating style constitute the general control environment. Risk assessment addresses the importance
of the identiﬁcation, analysis, and management of (operating, economic, industry, regulatory) risks that may prevent an entity from achieving its objectives. Control
activities include segregation of duties, approvals, reviews, reconciliations, and authorizations, which aim to mitigate the identiﬁed risks. Information and communica-
tion refer to the timely capture and dissemination of pertinent information on internal and external events throughout an entity, and include communication among
and betweenmanagement, employees, suppliers, and customers. Internalmonitoring continually evaluates the effectiveness of the other four internal control elements.
6 Theories explaining themotivations for voluntary disclosure in general are also applicable to voluntary disclosure of internal controlweakness. Prior studies suggest
that ﬁrms strategically adopt voluntary disclosure in general to reduce potential litigation threat (Skinner, 1994), signal outstanding performance (Watson, Shrives, &
Marston, 2002), strengthen themonitoring of management to reduce agency costs (Jensen &Meckling, 1976; Lang & Lundholm, 1993), legitimatize social status (Gray,
Owen, & Adams, 1996), and manage the stakeholder–ﬁrm relationship (Ullmann, 1985).
31X. Ji et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 52 (2017) 27–44of SOX 302 and SOX 404, and suggest that internal control deﬁciencies can affect abnormal accruals in two principal
ways—through random, unintentional misstatements and through intentional misrepresentations. These authors suggest that
ICWs are more likely associated with unintentional errors than intentional misstatements. Chan et al. (2008) also ﬁnd evidence
that ﬁrms reporting ICWs have higher ABSDA. By using OLS regression and path analysis, Lu et al. (2011) ﬁnd that there is an
overall negative net effect of ICWs on accrual quality in the Canadian setting.
Earnings management, being regarded as the intentional misrepresentation of ﬁnancial information, is also prevalent in
Chinese listed ﬁrms. Several studies ﬁnd that ﬁrms use discretionary accruals to inﬂate their proﬁts to seek eligibility for listing
on the Chinese stock market, to avoid the possibility of being delisted, and to gain the opportunity for rights issues (Chan et
al., 2008; Chen & Yuan, 2004; Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Jian & Wong, 2004; Liu & Lu, 2007). There has been very limited
study on the disclosure of ICWs and earnings quality in the Chinese context.7 Based on the above discussion, our ﬁrst hypothesis
is formulated as:
H1. Ceteris paribus, earnings quality, measured in ABSDA, is positively associated with ﬁrm disclosure of ICWs.
3.2. Type of internal control weaknesses, enterprise risk management, and earnings quality
The motivations and beneﬁts of voluntary disclosure of non-accounting-related ICWs derive from voluntary disclosure of non-
ﬁnancial information. The literature shows that non- ﬁnancial information is a leading indicator strongly associated with ﬁrm
performance (Banker, Potter, & Srinivasan, 2000; Ittner & Larcker, 1998). Ittner and Larcker (1998) ﬁnd that customer satisfaction
measures are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with accounting performance. By using time-series data from 18 hotels,
Banker et al. (2000) also ﬁnd that non-ﬁnancial measures, such as customer satisfaction, are positively related to ﬁnancial
performance. These authors ﬁnd that both non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial performance improve if there is an incentive plan that
includes non-ﬁnancial performance measures. Dhaliwal, Hogan, Trezevant, and Wilkins (2011) show that voluntary disclosure
of non-ﬁnancial information about corporate social responsibility can reduce the cost of equity capital.
Voluntary disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information also affects earnings quality, particularly the value relevance of ﬁnancial
information. Previous studies show that non- ﬁnancial information can be used both to substitute for and to complement ﬁnancial
information (Luft, 2009). Amir and Lev (1996) ﬁnd that accounting earnings alone are not value relevant; however, after adding
non-ﬁnancial measures of growth potential and market penetration, both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial information become value
relevant. These authors show a complementary relationship between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial information. Simpson (2010)
ﬁnds that disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information is strongly associated with the accuracy of earnings forecast. Dhaliwal, Li,
Tsang, and Yang (2011) show that issuance of stand-alone corporate social responsibility reports are related to lower analyst
forecast error. In summary, disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information can inﬂuence ﬁrm performance and earnings quality.
In line with this argument, disclosure of non-accounting-related ICWs, which can be regarded as non-ﬁnancial information,
can also affect earnings quality.
Although the focus of SOX 302 and 404 are on ﬁnancial reporting, previous studies also attempt to classify ICWs into different
categories and to investigate which types of ICW have more inﬂuence on earnings quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Doyle et
al., 2007; Ge & McVay, 2005). Using a sample of 261 companies that disclosed at least one material weakness (MW) under the
requirement of SOX 302 over the period 2002–2004, Ge and McVay (2005) ﬁnd that out of a total of 493 MWs in their sample,
the highest number of MWs (119) reported relate to account-speciﬁc MWs, followed by training (82), period-end/accounting
policies (68), and others.8 These authors also ﬁnd that most of the account-speciﬁc weaknesses affect accrual accounts, such as
accounts receivable, accounts payable, and inventory. Doyle et al. (2007) simplify the Ge and McVay (2005) classiﬁcation and
partition all MWs into account-speciﬁc and company-level MWs.9 These authors ﬁnd that since the MWs associated with
account-speciﬁc areas are auditable and the MWs existing at the company level are not auditable, the positive association
between weak internal controls and lower earnings quality is driven mainly by weakness disclosures relating to overall
company-level MWs.
One of the distinctive differences between Basic Standard (also called China “SOX” in the literature) and U.S. SOX is that the
disclosure scope of the Basic Standard is much broader than the scope of U.S. SOX. The Chinese Basic Standard requires ﬁrms to
disclose ICWs related to both ﬁnancial reporting and general management, while U.S. SOX focuses only on disclosure of ICWs
related to ﬁnancial reporting. We explore the unique Chinese setting by classifying the 18 areas of internal control
reporting into accounting-related versus non-accounting-related areas. Under the Chinese setting, Ji, Lu, and Qu (2015) report
that non-accounting-related areas, such as organizational structure and human resource management, are the areas with the7 The only study that comes close is Leng and Li (2011), which investigates the relationship between disclosure levels (index) of internal control, but not disclosure of
ICWs per se, and earnings quality. These authors ﬁnd that the higher the disclosure index of internal control, the better is the earnings quality. Our study is signiﬁcantly
different from Leng and Li (2011).We focus on investigating the impact of the disclosure of ICWs on earnings quality. In addition, Leng and Li (2011) cover only the year
2010, whereas our study covers the voluntary regime of ICW disclosure over the period 2010–2011.
8 Ge andMcVay (2005) classify thedisclosedmaterialweaknesses (MW) into nine types: “Account-Speciﬁc, Training, Period-EndReporting/Accounting Policies, Revenue
Recognition, Segregation of Duties, Account Reconciliation, Subsidiary-Speciﬁc, Senior Management, and Technology Issues” (p. 142).
9 According to Doyle et al. (2007), the account-speciﬁc MWs include: (1) inadequate internal controls for accounting for loss contingencies, including bad debts;
(2) deﬁciencies in the documentation of a receivables securitization program; and (3) no adequate internal controls over the application of new accounting principles
or application of existing accounting principles to new transactions. Company-level material weaknesses include those MWs related to (1) override by senior manage-
ment and (2) ineffective control environment.
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affect earnings quality, since the ICWs in non-accounting-related areas eventually result in a weak internal control environment.
For example, the lack of proper training of key personnel in accounting departments will compromise the internal checks and
balances mechanism, and this, in turn, will make these ﬁrms more likely to have more unintentional errors and to provide
managers with more opportunities to manipulate earnings. Our argument is echoed in Choi, Choi, Hogan, and Lee (2013).
Conducting ICW research in the reporting environment of Korea, Choi et al. ﬁnd that good internal control in human resources,
measured by human resource investment, is negatively associated with ICW disclosure but positively associated with the
likelihood of remediation of ICWs.
The Basic Standard (China SOX) not only has a broader scope including many non-accounting-related internal control areas,
but also is EMR focused. For example, it states that the culture of internal control at the top management level (“tone at the
top”) is crucial for an organization to successfully implement its risk management strategies and effectively manage potential
risks associated with its business operation and ﬁnancial reporting. In addition, the Basic Standard emphasizes that risk
management must be understood and embraced by business entities' personnel and driven from the top down through clear
and consistent communication and messaging from the board and senior management (MOF, 2010a).
Higher levels of internal control weaknesses existing in non-accounting-related areas would unavoidably affect the risk
management process ﬂowing down within an organization. Since ﬁnancial reporting is an integrated element in a listed ﬁrm,
and the ultimate quality of ﬁnancial reporting reﬂects a collection of different functions and activities in the process of
transforming ﬁnancial data to useful information for market participants (Wilkinson, 2000), the internal control weaknesses in
non-accounting-related areas are expected to have a negative impact on the information transformation process and diminish
the effectiveness of risk management, and, ultimately, the quality of ﬁnancial reporting.10 In this paper, we not only examine
the association between earnings quality and overall ICWs, but we also investigate whether earnings quality is associated with
different types of ICWs: accounting-related or non-accounting-related ICWs.11 Based on the preceding discussions, our second
hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H2. Ceteris paribus, earnings quality, measured in ABSDA, is positively associated with different types of ICW.
According to arguments relating to the potential impact of accounting-related and non-accounting-related ICWs on earnings
quality, our second hypothesis is further divided into:
H2a. Ceteris paribus, earnings quality, measured in ABSDA, is positively associated with ﬁrm disclosure of accounting-related
ICWs.
H2b. Ceteris paribus, earnings quality, measured in ABSDA, is positively associated with ﬁrm disclosure of non-accounting-related
ICWs.
4. Research design
Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) address the issue of sample selection bias. These authors point out that many accounting
articles in leading journals fail to control for selection bias (Heckman, 1979). Selection bias occurs when samples are not selected
randomly. The selection indicator, for example, whether a ﬁrm chooses to disclose ICWs, is an endogenous variable. To control for
selection bias, we apply a two-stage model to test our hypotheses. In the ﬁrst stage, we run the probit model (Model 1) and
estimate the likelihood of ﬁrms disclosing ICWs.10 For
this ﬁrm
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ð1Þwhere Prob(DISWEAK) is the estimated probability of ﬁrms disclosing ICWs, which is determined based on a ﬁrm's economic
characteristics, corporate governance, and ownership structure. Then, we calculate the inverse Mills' ratio from Model 1 and
add it into the second-stage models (Models 2 and 5).example, a Chinese ﬁrm listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange disclosed that due to a lack of proper approval procedures before signing guarantee contracts,
suffered a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial loss as the guarantor. Another ﬁrm reports that inadequate stafﬁng in the internal audit committee has reduced the efﬁciency
ctiveness of internal monitoring. Thus, the non-accounting-related ICWs impede a ﬁrm's ability to effectivelymanage the potential business risks,which in turn
e quality of ﬁnancial information.
hown inour sample, Chinese listedﬁrms disclosemore non-accounting-related ICWs,with 36.3% ICWsdisclosed being accounting-related,while 73.7% are non-
ing-related (Table 2, Panel B).
33X. Ji et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 52 (2017) 27–44Following prior studies (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Jones, 1991; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005), our proxy to measure
earnings quality is ABSDA. In our second-stage models, ABSDA is regressed against DISWEAK and other control variables in Model
2. The relationship between voluntary disclosure of ICWs and earnings quality (ABSDA) is presented by the coefﬁcient of ф1. We
expect ф1 to be positive and signiﬁcant.12 It is
in the C
2011). I
audit ﬁr
and topABSDAit ¼ α1 þ γ1IMR DISWEAKit þ ϕ1DISWEAKit
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þβ10AGEit þ β11BRDSIZEit þ β12BRDINDit þ β13SUPERSIZEit
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ð2ÞIMR_DISWEAK is the inverse Mills' ratio calculated based on the estimated probability of ﬁrms disclosing ICWs in Model 1.
DISWEAK is a dummy variable that equals 1 when ﬁrms disclose ICWs in ICRs, zero otherwise. We also include the following
control variables based on previous research (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & Kinney, 2007; Ittonen, 2010): (1) ﬁnancial performance
(ROA, LOSS, CFO); (2) size (SIZE); (3) growth (GROWTH); (4) leverage (LEV); (5) risk (RETURN_DEV); (6) business complexity
(TURNOVER_A, TURNOVER_I, AGE); (7) corporate governance (BRDIND, BRDSIZE, SUPERSIZE, SUPERIND, DUALITY, AC_EXP, POLICON);
(8) ownership structure (TOP3, CODE_STATE, TRADEABLE, INSTITUTE); and (9) external auditor status (CODE_BIG4, CODE_BIG10).
ROA is net income or total proﬁts after taxes divided by total assets. LOSS is an indicator that equals 1 when ﬁrm net income is
negative, zero otherwise. CFO is total cash ﬂow from operating activities, deﬂated by total assets at the beginning of the ﬁnancial
year. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. GROWTH is measured based on change in total sales revenue divided by total sales
revenue. LEV is the measurement of a ﬁrm's leverage, which equals total liability divided by total assets. RETURN_DEV is the
measurement of risk, calculated based on the standard deviation of monthly returns over the 12 months of the ﬁnancial year.
We use three measures, TURNOVER_A, TURNOVER_I, and AGE, to measure business complexity. TURNOVER_A is measured using
total accounts receivable divided by total sales revenue. TURNOVER_I is calculated using total inventory divided by total cost of
goods sold. AGE is calculated based on the number of years ﬁrms have operated. BRDIND represents the percentage of
independent directors on the board of directors (BOD). BRDSIZE is the logarithm of the number of directors. SUPERSIZE is the log-
arithm of the number of supervisors on the supervisory board. SUPERIND is the percentage of the number of non-paid supervisors
on the supervisory board. DUALITY equals 1 if a CEO is also the chairperson of the BOD, zero otherwise. AC_EXP is the percentage
of members of the audit committee with accounting, ﬁnance, or economic backgrounds. POLICON equals 1 if the CEO or chairman
of the BOD is or was a representative of the National People's Congress, a government ofﬁcial, or military ofﬁcer; it is zero
otherwise. TOP3 is the percentage of the top three shareholders' ownership interests in the ﬁrm. CODE_STATE is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the ﬁrm is a state-controlled ﬁrm based on information provided by the China Securities Index Ltd., zero
otherwise. TRADABLE is the percentage of shares that can be traded without restriction on both exchanges. INSTITUTE is the
percentage of shares held by management funds, and CODE_BIG4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm's external audit
ﬁrm is one of the Big 4 international ﬁrms (KPMG, Deloitte, PwC, or EY), zero otherwise. CODE_BIG10 is another dummy variable
that captures the impact of the top 10 local audit ﬁrms. The top 10 local audit ﬁrms are ranked by the Chinese Institute of
Certiﬁed Public Accountants based on audit fees.12 CODE_BIG10 equals 1 if the ﬁrm's external audit ﬁrm is one of the top 10
local audit ﬁrms, zero otherwise. Subscript i represents a ﬁrm and t represents a year, either 2010 or 2011.
ABSDA used in Model 2 is estimated based on Models 3 and 4. Total accruals (ACCRUAL) in Model 3 are calculated as the
difference between earnings (EARNINGS) and cash ﬂows from operating activities (CFO). CFO represents net cash ﬂows from
operating activities. ACCRUAL is decomposed into discretionary accruals (DAC) and non-discretionary accruals (NDAC) via the
modiﬁed Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991) with the addition of the lagged average return on assets (ROA) as a
controlling variable, as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) (Model 4). DAC represents the unexplained portion of observations
(εit) based on Model 4. ABSDA is the absolute value of DAC.ACCRUALit ¼ EARNINGSit−CFOit ð3ÞACCRUALit ¼ β0 þ β1 ΔREVit−ΔRECitð Þ þ β2PPEit þ β3ROAit−1 þ εit ð4Þ
where EARNINGS is operating proﬁts divided by total assets at the beginning of year t; CFO is cash ﬂows from operating
activities divided by total assets at the beginning of year t; ACCRUAL is total accruals divided by total assets at the beginninginteresting to note that aftermany years of reform in the auditmarket beginning from1978, the international Big 4ﬁrms have gained considerablemarket share
hinese audit market, ranked as the top four audit ﬁrms in China throughout the period 2008–2011 (Chinese Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants [CICPA],
n recent years, the Chinese government has promulgated various policies to encourage development of local Chinese accounting ﬁrms. As a result, domestic
ms have grown signiﬁcantly in market share, especially large domestic ﬁrms. In our study, we pay particular attention to the differences between the Big 4
10 local audit ﬁrms, and control both factors when we investigate the issue of ICW disclosure and earnings quality.
Table 1
Sample
Panel
Numb
Numb
Perce
Less
Mark
Finan
Corpo
Owne
Sub
Final
Panel
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Panel
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
34 X. Ji et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 52 (2017) 27–44of year t; ΔREV is the change in revenue from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at the beginning of year t; ΔRER is
the change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at the beginning of year t; PPE is gross
property, plant and equipment in year t, divided by total assets at the beginning of year t; ROA is operating proﬁts after
tax divided by average total assets at year t; i is an observation for a ﬁrm, and t is an observation for a year. The coefﬁcient
of ф1 in Model 2 indicates an association between ﬁrm control weaknesses and discretional accruals. It is expected that
DISWEAK is positively and statistically signiﬁcantly associated with ABSDA, as the more ICWs ﬁrms have, the more likely
ﬁrms are to have intentional and unintentional misstatements and hence, lower earnings quality. We also include control
variables to control other factors that may have an impact on ABSDA. We expect that ABSDA is negatively related to CFO,
since ﬁrms have less incentive to manage earnings if they have more cash (Dechow et al., 1995). ABSDA is positively
related to leverage, growth, risk, and business complexity, according to previous research (Chan et al., 2008). The
relationship between ABSDA and SIZE is expected to be positive, as smaller ﬁrms tend to have lower-quality accruals
(Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Doyle et al., 2007). Previous research consistently ﬁnds that the improvement of corporate
governance limits a ﬁrm's opportunities to manipulate earnings (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Liu & Lu, 2007). It is also
shown that ownership-concentrated and state-controlled ﬁrms are more likely to engage in earnings management (Chen
et al., 2006; Hu & Leung, 2012; Liu & Tian, 2012; Xu & Wang, 1999).selection and industrial distribution.
A: Sample selection procedure
2010 2011 Total
er of ﬁrms listed on main boards 1365 1389 2754
er of ﬁrms providing ICRs 830 862 1692
ntage of ﬁrms providing ICRs
: number of ﬁrms with missing observations
60.8% 62.1% 61.44%
et return data 23 45 68
cial data 62 33 95
rate governance data 130 137 267
rship data 118 85 203
total 333 300 633
available data 497 562 1059
B: Industry distribution by year
Industry code Industry name 2010 2011 Total
A Agriculture 9 1.8% 9 1.6% 18 1.7%
B Mining 18 3.6% 21 3.7% 39 3.7%
C Manufacturing 268 53.9% 301 53.6% 569 53.7%
D Utilities 32 6.4% 30 5.3% 62 5.9%
E Construction 10 2.0% 16 2.8% 26 2.5%
F Transportation 25 5.0% 35 6.2% 60 5.7%
G IT 27 5.4% 32 5.7% 59 5.6%
H Wholesale & Retail 38 7.6% 38 6.8% 76 7.2%
J Real Estate 35 7.0% 43 7.7% 78 7.4%
K Social Service 13 2.6% 17 3.0% 30 2.8%
L Media 4 0.8% 4 0.7% 8 0.8%
M Conglomerates 18 3.6% 16 2.8% 34 3.2%
Total 497 100.0% 562 100.0% 1059 100.0%
C: Industry distribution by exchange
Industry code Industry name Shanghai Shenzhen Total
A Agriculture 10 1.9% 8 1.5% 18 1.7%
B Mining 19 3.7% 20 3.7% 39 3.7%
C Manufacturing 273 53.0% 296 54.4% 569 53.7%
D Utilities 34 6.6% 28 5.1% 62 5.9%
E Construction 21 4.1% 5 0.9% 26 2.5%
F Transportation 42 8.2% 18 3.3% 60 5.7%
G IT 34 6.6% 25 4.6% 59 5.6%
H Wholesale & Retail 30 5.8% 46 8.5% 76 7.2%
J Real Estate 26 5.0% 52 9.6% 78 7.4%
K Social Service 6 1.2% 24 4.4% 30 2.8%
L Media 4 0.8% 4 0.7% 8 0.8%
M Conglomerates 16 3.1% 18 3.3% 34 3.2%
Total 515 100.0% 544 100.0% 1059 100.0%
35X. Ji et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 52 (2017) 27–44In our second-stage regression, we further divide overall ICWs into accounting-related and non-accounting-related ICWs,
DISWEAK_ACC and DISWEAK_NONACC in Model 5, to test whether accounting-related or non-accounting-related ICWs are
associated with earnings quality. DISWEAK_ACC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if ﬁrms disclose accounting-related weaknesses
and zero otherwise, while DISWEAK_NONACC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if ﬁrms disclose non-accounting-related
weaknesses, zero otherwise. We expect that both the ф1 of DISWEAK_ACC and ф2 of DISWEAK_NONACC in Model 5 are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant.13 IndABSDAit ¼ α1 þ γ1IMR DISWEAKit þ ϕ1DISWEAK ACCit þ ϕ2DISWEAK NONACCit
þβ1ROAit þ β2CFOit þ β3LOSSit þ β4SIZEit þ β5LEVit þ β6GROWTHit
þβ7RETURN DEVit þ β8TURNOVER Ait þ β9TURNOVER Iit
þβ10AGEit þ β11BRDSIZEit þ β12BRDINDit þ β13SUPERSIZEit
þβ14SUPERINDit þ β15DUALITYit þ β16AC EXPit þ β17POLICON17
þβ18TOP3it þ β19CODE STATEit þ β20TRADABLEit þ β21INSTITUTEit
þβ22CODE BIG4it þ β23CODE BIG10it
þ∑
18
j¼1
γ jINDit þ φ1Y2010it þ εit
ð5Þ5. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
5.1. Sample selection
Our sample consists of publicly listed ﬁrms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange that issued ICRs
voluntarily in 2010 and/or 2011. According to Table 1, Panel A, 60.8% of listed ﬁrms provided ICRs in 2010, and 62.1% of listed
ﬁrms provided ICRs in 2011. After deducting missing data, our ﬁnal sample includes 1059 observations (497 observations in
2010 and 562 observations in 2011). We manually collected all ICW data from ICRs released by these 1059 ﬁrms on the two
exchanges' websites. Ownership structure data as well as market and accounting information data were collected from the
China Stock Market & Accounting Research database.
We eliminate ﬁrms from the ﬁnance sector, which is subject to a different set of regulations; the industry distributions are
shown in Panel B of Table 1.13 The top ﬁve sectors of the sample ﬁrms are the manufacturing sector (53.7%), the real estate sector
(7.4%), wholesale and retail sector (7.2%), utilities sector (5.9%), and transportation sector (5.7%).
Our sample is dominated by the manufacturing sector, which reﬂects the same pattern for all listed ﬁrms on the two Chinese
stock exchanges. This industrial distribution also mirrors the structural development of the Chinese economy, which has largely
beneﬁtted from its manufacturing sector and booming prices in real estate. Industry distribution by stock exchange is shown in
Panel C of Table 1. This panel shows that 48.6% of our sample ﬁrms are listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, while 51.4%
are listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
5.2. Information disclosed in ICRs
The disclosure pattern of ICWs is shown in Table 2. According to Panel A, 197 out of 497 listed ﬁrms issued ICRs with no ICW
in 2010, and 274 out of 562 listed ﬁrms issued ICRs with no ICW in 2011. The severity of the ICWs is measured by ICW score.
According to the Basic Standard, a ﬁrm needs to identify the level of severity of each ICW in its ICRs. Three levels of ICW severity
are stipulated in the Basic Standard: minor, major, and serious. We calculate the ICW score by multiplying the frequency of ICWs
and the level of severity of ICWs. The severity of weaknesses is coded 0 – no weakness, 1 – minor weakness, 2 – major weakness,
and 3 – serious weakness. For example, if a ﬁrm reports two minor weaknesses, three major weaknesses, and two serious
weaknesses, the total ICW score for this ﬁrm would be 14 (14 = 2 × 1 + 3 × 2 + 2 × 3).
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, on average, 44.5% of ﬁrms report not having any ICW; 11.3% of ﬁrms report the severity of
ICWs as 1; 10.3% of ﬁrms disclose the level of severity as 2. Furthermore, 33.9% of ﬁrms report the severity at level 3 or above.
Comparing 2011 with 2010, the percentage of ﬁrms disclosing no ICWs increased from 39.6% in 2010 to 48.8% in 2011. On the
other hand, ﬁrms disclosing ICWs decreased from 60.4% in 2010 to 51.2%. The percentage (number) of ﬁrms to have their ICRs
audited increased from 28.4% (141 ﬁrms) in 2010 to 35.4% (199 ﬁrms) in 2011.
We divide ICWs into two types: accounting-related versus non-accounting-related ICWs according to the Internal Control
Application Guidelines. Panel B of Table 2 provides information about the two types of ICWs voluntarily disclosed by listed ﬁrms
in 2010 and 2011. ICWs disclosed in accounting-related areas account for 34.5% in 2010 and 20.5% in 2011. The decrease over
the two years is signiﬁcant. The percentages of ICWs disclosed in non- accounting-related areas are 65.5% in 2010 and 79.5% in
2011. The results show that Chinese listed ﬁrms have more ICWs in non-accounting-related areas than in accounting-related
areas. Therefore, management needs to pay more attention to non-accounting-related areas to improve the overall quality of
internal control.ustries are classiﬁed according to the CSRC's Guideline on Industry Classiﬁcation of Listed Companies (CSRC, 2012).
Table 2
Disclosures of internal control weaknesses.
Panel A: Overall internal control weakness scores
ICW score 2010 No. of ﬁrms % 2011 No. of ﬁrms % Total no. of ﬁrms %
0 197 39.6% 274 48.8% 471 44.5%
1 65 13.1% 55 9.8% 120 11.3%
2 65 13.1% 44 7.8% 109 10.3%
3 61 12.3% 36 6.4% 97 9.2%
4 43 8.7% 35 6.2% 78 7.4%
5 21 4.2% 27 4.8% 48 4.5%
6 18 3.6% 26 4.6% 44 4.2%
7 9 1.8% 10 1.8% 19 1.8%
8 3 0.6% 15 2.7% 18 1.7%
9 5 1.0% 13 2.3% 18 1.7%
10 2 0.4% 12 2.1% 14 1.3%
11 1 0.2% 1 0.2% 2 0.2%
12 3 0.6% 4 0.7% 7 0.7%
13 1 0.2% 2 0.4% 3 0.3%
14 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 3 0.3%
15 2 0.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.2%
16 0 0.0% 3 0.5% 3 0.3%
20 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.1%
22 1 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.1%
65 0 0.0% 1 0.2% 1 0.1%
Total ﬁrms 497 100.0% 562 100.0% 1059 100.0%
ICRs that have been audited 141 28.4% 199 35.4% 340 32.1%
*ICW scores are calculated by multiplying the number of weaknesses reported with severity of weakness. The severity of weaknesses is coded as 0 – no
weakness, 1 –minor weakness, 2 –major weakness, and 3 – serious weakness. The reporting of three levels, minor, major and serious of ICW severity is
required by the Basic Standard. For example if a ﬁrm reports three minor weaknesses, four major weaknesses, and one serious weakness, the total ICW score
for this ﬁrm would be 14 (14 = 3 × 1 + 4 × 2 + 1 × 3).
Panel B: Areas of internal control weaknesses
Internal control weakness areas Item no.
2010 2011 Total
Score % Score % Score %
Accounting-related
Finance and investment 6 154 15.0% 81 5.9% 235 9.8%
Procurement 7 29 2.8% 20 1.5% 49 2.0%
Asset management 8 36 3.5% 27 2.0% 63 2.6%
Sales 9 44 4.3% 32 2.3% 76 3.2%
Financial reporting 14 73 7.1% 111 8.1% 184 7.7%
Budgeting 15 18 1.8% 10 0.7% 28 1.2%
Subtotal 354 34.5% 281 20.5% 635 26.5%
Non-accounting-related
Organizational structure 1 140 13.6% 341 24.9% 481 20.1%
Development of strategy 2 12 1.2% 5 0.4% 17 0.7%
Human resource management 3 142 13.8% 217 15.9% 359 15.0%
Social responsibility 4 11 1.1% 4 0.3% 15 0.6%
Organizational culture 5 41 4.0% 77 5.6% 118 4.9%
Research and development 10 4 0.4% 4 0.3% 8 0.3%
Construction projects 11 12 1.2% 13 0.9% 25 1.0%
Guarantee 12 21 2.0% 5 0.4% 26 1.1%
Outsourcing 13 3 0.3% 5 0.4% 8 0.3%
Contract management 16 13 1.3% 10 0.7% 23 1.0%
Internal reporting system 17 23 2.2% 71 5.2% 94 3.9%
IT system 18 34 3.3% 26 1.9% 60 2.5%
Not speciﬁed 19 217 21.1% 310 22.6% 527 22.0%
Subtotal 673 65.5% 1088 79.5% 1761 73.5%
TOTAL scores 1027 100.0% 1369 100.0% 2396 100.0%
36 X. Ji et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 52 (2017) 27–44There are six accounting-related ICW areas: ﬁnance and investment, procurement, asset management, sales, ﬁnancial
reporting, and budgeting. Among these, most accounting-related ICWs are reported in ﬁnance and investment (9.8%), followed
by ﬁnancial reporting (7.7%) and sales (3.2%). It is evident that China SOX has a much broader scope than the U.S. SOX. In
China, ﬁnancial reporting is only one of the accounting-related areas, and ICWs reported in this area only account for 7.7% of
the total ICWs reported.
The 12 non-accounting-related ICW areas are: organizational structure, development of strategy, human resource
management, social responsibility, organizational culture, research and development, construction projects, guarantee,
37X. Ji et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 52 (2017) 27–44outsourcing, contract management, internal reporting system, and IT system. Of the twelve non-accounting ICW areas,
organizational structure has the highest number of ICW disclosures, with an average of 20.1% over two years. The high level of
ICW disclosure in this area indicates that many ﬁrms are weak in their monitoring mechanism, possibly resulting in poor internal
control. Following organizational structure, the second-most common ICW area is human resource management (15%), which
includes issues related to staff selection, appointment, and training.
Firms disclosing ICWs always address their remediation measures along with their ICWs in one of the sections of
ICRs—internal control weakness and remediation. In this section, some ﬁrms disclose their intended remediation measures,
while other ﬁrms disclose both implemented remediation measures and related outcomes.14
5.3. Descriptive statistics
The basic descriptive statistical analysis for each of the testing and control variables is reported in Table 3.15 According to Panel
A of Table 3, the mean of the measurement of earnings quality (ABSDA) is 0.06, and the median of ABSDA is 0.042. The means of
the disclosure level of ICW (DISWEAK) and the ICW score (DISSCORE) are 0.5552 and 2.2625, respectively, meaning that more
than half of ﬁrms disclose ICWs. The average ICW score is 2.2625. The maximum disclosure score is 65, which represents 65
minor ICWs disclosed by one ﬁrm in its ICR. Regarding the two types of weakness, the mean of accounting-related ICWs is
0.2417 (DISWEAK_ACC), and 0.5382 (DISWEAK_NONACC) is the mean of non-accounting-related ICWs, implying that ﬁrms are
twice as likely to have non-accounting-related weaknesses than accounting-related weaknesses. Similar results are found under
the measures of ICW scores, with the mean of DISSCORE for accounting-related ICWs at 0.5996, while for non-accounting-related
ICWs, it is 1.6629.
For the control variables of ﬁrm characteristics, the mean of ROA is 0.0597, and the mean of CFO is 0.0459. Some 5.95% of
sample ﬁrms make losses. The mean of SIZE is 22.4987 (median, 22.3551), and the standard deviation of SIZE is only 1.3283.
The average of leverage (LEV) of the sample ﬁrms is 53.05%, and the average growth rate (GROWTH) is 32.62%. The mean of
the standard deviation of monthly returns over the ﬁnancial year (RETURN_DEV), which is the measurement of risk, is 0.1154.
Firm age ranges from 2 years to 29 years. The average of operating years is 15.0788 years.16 In terms of corporate governance
variables, the mean of the logarithm of number the directors in the BOD (BRDSIZE) is 2.2187, and the mean of the logarithm of
the number of supervisors on the supervisory board (SUPERSIZE) is 1.3504. Of the sample ﬁrms, 12.37% have the chairperson
of the BOD also serving as CEO. On average, 37.11% of members of the BOD are independent directors, while 39% of members
of the supervisory board are non-paid supervisors. Table 3 also shows that on average, more than 57.64% of members of the
audit committee have ﬁnancial expertise, and 22.57% of sample ﬁrms are identiﬁed as politically connected ﬁrms.
In terms of ownership structure variables, the mean of the top three shareholdings (TOP3) is 17.93%, and 72.52% of our sample
ﬁrms are state-controlled. The tradability of shares is 85.05%. On average, the institutional ownership (INSTITUTE) is 6.71%. As
shown in Table 3, only 10% of sample ﬁrms choose BIG 4 audit ﬁrms (CODE_BIG4) as their external auditors, while nearly 50%
of sample ﬁrms elect to have Big 10 local audit ﬁrms (CODE_BIG10) as their external auditors. These statistics depict the dynamic
change in the Chinese audit market (Chinese Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants [CICPA], 2011; Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2012; Mo,
Rui, & Wu, 2015).
Panel B of Table 3 compares the differences in testing and controlling variables between ﬁrms disclosing ICWs and ﬁrms not
disclosing ICWs. Firms disclosing ICWs have higher discretionary accruals than ﬁrms not disclosing ICWs. The mean of ASBDA for
ﬁrms disclosing ICWs is 0.0631, while the mean of ABSDA is 0.0561 for ﬁrms not disclosing ICWs. The t-test indicates that the two
groups' ABSDA means are statistically different. Firms not disclosing ICWs have higher proﬁtability and less percentage of loss-
making than ﬁrms disclosing ICWs. The average size of ﬁrms not disclosing ICWs is 22.7488, while the average size of ﬁrms
disclosing ICWs is 22.2983. The difference in size is also statistically signiﬁcant.
Other signiﬁcant differences between the two groups are found in leverage and risks. Firms not disclosing ICWs have higher
leverages but lower risks, measured by standard deviation of returns (RETURN_DEV). On average, ﬁrms not disclosing ICWs are
younger than ﬁrms disclosing ICWs.
For variables in corporate governance, ﬁrms not reporting ICWs have larger boards of directors and more independent
supervisory boards. These results are consistent with ﬁndings from prior literature that better corporate governance can improve
risk management and internal control and reduce the likelihood of reporting ICWs (Dhaliwal, Hogan, et al., 2011; Doyle et al.,
2007). Panel B of Table 3 also shows that ﬁrms not reporting ICWs are less likely to be politically connected but have lower14 For example, a listed ﬁrm reports four ICWs in its 2010 ICR. They are: (1) the internal control systems over internal authorization, procurement activities, and in-
formation disclosure have not yet been completed; (2) there is a lack of awell-established internal control systemover risk identiﬁcation and riskmanagement; (3) the
internal control system of newly acquired subsidiaries is still weaker than the internal control system of the parent company; and (4) because it is limited by human
resources, a propermonitoringmechanism over the implementation of internal control is lacking. Then, in the internal control weakness and remediation section of its
ICR, this ﬁrm reports the following remedies that have been implemented: (1) in order to strengthen the monitoring over the implementation of internal control, our
company has expanded the internal audit department through new recruitment; (2) in order to improve the internal control system over information disclosure and
ﬁnancial reporting, our company has issued new internal control regulations on information disclosure and ﬁnancial reporting; (3) the company has organized various
training for employees to build up their awareness of risk identiﬁcation and risk management; and (4) the company has purchased new computer software to assist
with risk identiﬁcation and management. Finally, this ﬁrm assesses the outcomes of remediation and states that “by the end of the ﬁnancial year, 90% of remediation
measures have been implemented successfully.”
15 All continuous variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.
16 Unlike Ge andMcVay (2005), who use the number of years the ﬁrm has share price data available on the database as the proxy for ﬁrm experience in internal con-
trol reporting, we use the exact longevity or operating years of the sample ﬁrms in our study.
Table 3
Basic descriptive statistical analysis.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for all ﬁrms providing ICRs
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Firms
Testing variables
DISWEAK 0.5552 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4972 1059
DISWEAK_ACC 0.2417 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4283 1059
DISWEAK_NONACC 0.5382 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4988 1059
DISSCORE 2.2625 1.0000 65.0000 0.0000 3.5923 1059
DISSCORE_ACC 0.5996 0.0000 14.0000 0.0000 1.4499 1059
DISSCORE_NONACC 1.6629 1.0000 65.0000 0.0000 2.8746 1059
ABSDA 0.0600 0.0420 0.3717 0.0000 0.0607 1059
Firm characteristics
ROA 0.0597 0.0453 0.6393 -0.1589 0.0744 1059
LOSS 0.0595 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2367 1059
CFO 0.0459 0.0439 0.4839 -0.3736 0.1096 1059
SIZE 22.4987 22.3551 27.7533 18.5865 1.3283 1059
GROWTH 0.3265 0.2041 10.4625 -0.6894 0.8459 1059
LEV 0.5305 0.5437 1.2399 0.0535 0.1887 1059
RETURN_DEV 0.1154 0.1118 0.2887 0.0509 0.0335 1059
TURNOVER_A 0.1184 0.0802 1.0194 0.0000 0.1340 1059
TURNOVER_I 0.8499 0.2390 21.0149 0.0000 2.0771 1059
AGE 15.0708 15.0000 29.0000 2.0000 3.8325 1059
Corporate governance
BRDSIZE 2.2187 2.1972 2.8332 1.6094 0.1983 1059
BRDIND 0.3711 0.3333 0.5714 0.2500 0.0570 1059
SUPERSIZE 1.3504 1.0986 2.1972 0.6931 0.3025 1059
SUPERIND 0.3900 0.4000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2808 1059
DUALITY 0.1237 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3294 1059
AC_EXP 0.5764 0.6670 1.0000 0.0000 0.2749 1059
POLICON 0.2257 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4182 1059
Ownership structure
TOP3 0.1793 0.1519 0.5924 0.0086 0.1332 1059
TOP10 0.1805 0.1525 0.5927 0.0095 0.1328 1059
CODE_STATE 0.7252 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4466 1059
TRADABLE 0.8505 0.9958 1.0000 0.1335 0.2251 1059
INSTITUTE 0.0671 0.0315 0.3689 0.0000 0.0829 1059
External Auditor
CODE_BIG4 0.1001 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3003 1059
CODE_BIG10 0.4693 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4993 1059
Panel B: Comparison between ﬁrms disclosing ICWs and ﬁrms not disclosing ICWs
Firms not disclosing ICWs Firms disclosing ICWs
t-tests
p-values
(n = 471)
Mean
(n = 588)
Mean (2 tailed)
ABSDA 0.0561 0.0631 -1.8623 0.0628
ROA 0.0640 0.0562 1.7091 0.0877
CFO 0.0421 0.0489 -1.0007 0.3172
SIZE 22.7488 22.2983 5.5607 0.0000
GROWTH 0.3091 0.3404 -0.5988 0.5494
LEV 0.5441 0.5195 2.1089 0.0352
RETURN_DEV 0.1128 0.1175 -2.3063 0.0213
TURNOVER_A 0.1167 0.1198 -0.3643 0.7157
TURNOVER_I 0.7939 0.8948 -0.7854 0.4324
AGE 14.4140 15.5969 -5.0489 0.0000
BRDSIZE 2.2358 2.2050 2.5210 0.0118
BRDIND 0.3735 0.3691 1.2457 0.2131
SUPERSIZE 1.3564 1.3455 0.5803 0.5618
SUPERIND 0.4179 0.3676 2.9036 0.0038
AC_EXP 0.5548 0.5936 -2.2896 0.0222
TOP3 0.2109 0.1539 7.0711 0.0000
TOP10 0.2122 0.1551 7.1115 0.0000
TRADABLE 0.8447 0.8552 -0.7577 0.4488
INSTITUTE 0.0665 0.0676 -0.2234 0.8233
Dummy control variables
Firms not disclosing ICWs Firms disclosing ICWs
Chi-tests
p-value
(n = 471)
Frequency
(n = 588)
Frequency (2-tailed)
LOSS 0.0425 0.0731 3.8646 0.0493
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Table 3 (continued)
Dummy control variables
Firms not disclosing ICWs Firms disclosing ICWs
Chi-tests
p-value
(n = 471)
Frequency
(n = 588)
Frequency (2-tailed)
DUALITY 0.1146 0.1310 0.4996 0.4797
POLICON 0.1996 0.2466 3.0455 0.0810
CODE_STATE 0.7622 0.6956 0.0010 0.9753
CODE_BIG4 0.1465 0.0629 19.3603 0.0000
CODE_BIG10 0.4416 0.4915 2.4164 0.1201
DISWEAK = 1 if ﬁrms disclose internal control weaknesses, 0 otherwise; DISWEAK_ACC = 1 if ﬁrms disclose accounting-related internal control weaknesses, 0
otherwise; DISWEAK_NOACC = 1 if ﬁrms disclose non-accounting-related internal control weaknesses, 0 otherwise; DISSCORE = number of ICWs multiples
level of severity of ICWs; Severity of ICWs is coded 0 – no weakness, 1 – minor weakness, 2 – major weakness, and 3 – serious weakness; DISSCORE_ACC = -
number of accounting-related ICWs multiples level of severity of ICWs; DISSCORE_NOACC = number of non-accounting-related ICWs multiples level of severity
of ICWs; ABSDA = absolute discretional accruals; ROA = net income or total proﬁts after taxes divided by total assets; LOSS = 1 if net income in ﬁrms is negative,
0 otherwise; CFO = total cash ﬂows from operating activities deﬂated by total assets at the beginning of the ﬁnancial year; SIZE = logarithm of total assets;
GROWTH = changes of sales revenues divided by sales revenues; LEV = total liability divided by total assets; RETURN_DEV = standard deviation of monthly
returns over the 12 months of the ﬁnancial year; TURNOVER_A = total accounts receivable divided by total sales revenue; TURNOVER_I = total inventory divided
by total cost of goods sold; AGE = number of years ﬁrms have operated, BRDSIZE = logarithm of the number of directors on the BOD; BRDIND = percentage of
independent directors on the BOD; SUPERSIZE = logarithm of number of supervisors on the supervisory board; SUPERIND = percentage of number of non-paid
supervisors on the supervisory board; DUALITY = 1 if a CEO is also the chairperson of the BOD, 0 otherwise; AC_EXP is the percentage of members with account-
ing, ﬁnance or economic background on the audit committee; POLICON equals 1 if CEO or chairman of BOD is or was a representative of the National People's
Congress, a government ofﬁcial or military ofﬁcer, 0 otherwise; TOP3 = percentage of the top three shareholders' ownership interests in the ﬁrms; TOP10 = -
percentage of the top ten shareholders' ownership interests in the ﬁrms; CODE_STATE = 1 if the ﬁrm is a state-controlled ﬁrm, 0 otherwise; TRADABLE = -
percentage of shares that can be traded without any restrictions; INSTITUTE = percentage of shares held by management funds; CODE_BIG4 = if Big 4 audit
ﬁrms, 0 otherwise; CODE_BIG10 = 1 if top 10 Chinese local audit ﬁrm, 0 otherwise.
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ﬁrms not disclosing ICWs have higher ownership concentration, measured by TOP3 or TOP10, than ﬁrms disclosing ICWs. This
result supports the alignment effect (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).17 For external auditors, ﬁrms not revealing ICWs are more likely
to engage Big 4 auditors, but the percentages for those using the top 10 local audit ﬁrms are not signiﬁcantly different between
the two groups.
6. Empirical results and analysis
6.1. Earnings quality and disclosure of ICWs
Table 4 provides results addressing whether disclosure of ICW inﬂuences earnings quality in terms of ABSDA. Model 2 tests the
association between ICW disclosure and ABSDA, while Model 5 examines the relationship between different types of ICW and
ABSDA. As discussed above, discretionary accruals are calculated via the modiﬁed Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones,
1991) with added lagged ROA as a controlling variable (Kothari et al., 2005).
According to Table 4, the coefﬁcient of DISWEAK in Model 2 is 0.0087 and is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with ABSDA
(p = 0.0081, one-tailed) after controlling for sample selection bias. As a higher value of ABSDA represents lower earnings quality,
such positive associations imply that ﬁrms with ICWs have poorer earnings quality. This is consistent with the Doyle et al. (2007)
ﬁnding in the U.S. setting that ﬁrms with MWs have poorer earnings quality. Our results support H1; that is, earnings quality is
associated with disclosure of ICWs.
With regard to our control variables, in Model 2, loss-making ﬁrms (LOSS), high-geared ﬁrms (LEV), and ﬁrms with longer
business cycles (TURNOVER_I) are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with higher ABSDA. Growth (GROWTH) and ﬁrm size
(SIZE) are negatively associated with ABSDA. These results are consistent with previous ﬁndings that earnings quality is associated
with certain ﬁrm characteristics; for example, smaller ﬁrms tend to have lower earnings quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007;
Dechow & Dichev, 2002). Furthermore, prior studies ﬁnd that ﬁrms with better performance (ROA) are more likely to engage
in earnings management, resulting in higher ABSDA (Dechow & Dichev, 2002). The coefﬁcient of ROA in Model 2 is positive
and signiﬁcant, supporting this view. Previous research shows that ﬁrms with more cash ﬂow are less likely to manipulate
earnings, resulting in lower ABSDA (Goh & Li, 2011). Our results on the coefﬁcients of CFO also support this view.
In terms of the association between earnings quality and corporate governance characteristics, the coefﬁcient on board size
(BRDSIZE) is negative and signiﬁcant in Model 2, suggesting that the larger a ﬁrm's board is, the lower is its ABSDA, which
represents a higher earnings quality (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007). The coefﬁcient on independence of the supervisory board
(SUPERIND) is negative and signiﬁcant, implying that the more effective a ﬁrm's supervisory board is, the higher is its earnings
quality. However, our results on independence of BOD and the size of supervisory board show no signiﬁcant relationships with
earnings quality. The reason is that following SOX in the United States and similar corporate governance reforms in other Western17 According to agency theory, agency costs are reduced as the owner-manager's holding is increased. Therefore, the interests of the owner and outside shareholders
becomealigned. A positive relationship is expected between earnings quality and the concentration of ownership. It is called the “convergence of interest” or “alignment
effect” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Table 4
Relationship between disclosure of internal control weaknesses and absolute discretionary accruals.
Dependent variable: ABSDA
Sign
Model 2 Model 5
Independent variables Coeff. t-stats Coeff. Coeff. t-stats Coeff.
C 0.0793 1.4367 0.0756 0.0811 1.4664 0.0706
IMR_DISWEAK ? 0.4122 2.2141 0.0135 0.4100 2.1689 0.0139
DISWEAK + 0.0087 2.4080 0.0081
DISWEAK_ACC + 0.0068 1.3546 0.0649
DISWEAK_NOACC + 0.0064 1.6729 0.0527
ROA + 0.1848 2.3363 0.0099 0.1876 2.3612 0.0090
CFO – −0.0612 −1.4866 0.0687 −0.0623 −1.4815 0.0650
LOSS + 0.0406 4.4990 0.0000 0.0401 4.4800 0.0000
SIZE ? −0.0058 −2.4044 0.0082 −0.0058 −2.2986 0.0084
LEV + 0.0298 1.9225 0.0274 0.0300 1.9071 0.0263
GROWTH ? −0.0025 −0.6769 0.2493 −0.0026 −0.7062 0.2359
RETURN_DEV + 0.0001 0.0023 0.4991 0.0013 −0.0121 0.4914
TURNOVER_A + 0.0083 0.5725 0.2836 0.0079 0.5847 0.2937
TURNOVER_I + 0.0056 2.9809 0.0015 0.0056 2.9261 0.0014
AGE ? 0.0031 2.3699 0.0090 0.0031 2.3432 0.0092
BRDSIZE ? −0.0433 −2.0858 0.0186 −0.0435 −2.0948 0.0180
BRDIND – −0.0401 −0.8211 0.2059 −0.0395 −0.7822 0.2095
SUPERSIZE ? −0.0019 −0.2675 0.3946 −0.0020 −0.2794 0.3912
SUPERIND – −0.0191 −1.7518 0.0401 −0.0193 −1.7554 0.0380
DUALITY + −0.0033 −0.5817 0.2805 −0.0032 −0.5779 0.2881
AC_EXP – 0.0248 1.9821 0.0239 0.0240 1.9813 0.0275
POLICON + 0.0097 1.5693 0.0585 0.0096 0.1432 0.0606
TOP3 + −0.1257 −1.9865 0.0236 −0.1243 −1.9404 0.0248
CODE_STATE + 0.0015 0.3346 0.3690 0.0018 0.2852 0.3427
TRADABLE – −0.0381 −2.3107 0.0105 −0.0379 −2.2895 0.0109
INSTITUTE – −0.0060 −0.2237 0.4116 −0.0051 −0.3285 0.4256
CODE_BIG4 – −0.0258 −2.2872 0.0112 −0.0256 −2.2809 0.0118
CODE_BIG10 – 0.0000 −0.0005 0.4998 −0.0001 −0.0131 0.4935
Industries Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes
R-squared 0.2171 0.2192
Adjusted R-squared 0.1831 0.1845
F-statistic 6.3889 6.3181
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.8517 1.8520
Observations 1059 1059
ABSDA = absolute discretionary accruals; IMR_DISWEAK = inverse Mill's ratio; DISWEAK = 1 if ﬁrms disclose ICWs, 0 otherwise; ROA = return on
assets; CFO = cash ﬂow from operating activities; LOSS = loss making; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; LEV = total liability divided by total assets;
GROWTH = changes of sales revenues divided by sales revenue; RETURN_DEV = standard deviation of monthly returns over the 12 months of the
ﬁnancial year; TURNOVER_A = total accounts receivable divided by total sales revenue; TURNOVER_I = total inventory divided by total costs of goods sold;
AGE = number of years ﬁrms have operated. BRDSIZE = logarithm of number of directors on the BOD; BRDIND = percentage of independent directors on the
BOD; SUPERSIZE = logarithm of number of supervisors on the supervisory board; SUPERIND = percentage of number of non-paid supervisors on the supervisory
board; DUALITY = 1 if a CEO is also chairperson of the BOD, 0 otherwise; AC_EXP is the percentage of members with accounting, ﬁnance, or economic background
in audit committee; POLICON equals 1 if CEO or chairman of BOD is or was a representative of the National People's Congress, a government ofﬁcial, or military
ofﬁcer, 0 otherwise; TOP3 = percentage of top three shareholders' ownership interests in the ﬁrms; CODE_STATE = 1 if ﬁrm is a state- controlled ﬁrm, 0
otherwise; TRADABLE = percentage of shares that can be traded without any restrictions; INSTITUTE = percentage of shares held by management funds;
CODE_BIG4 = if Big 4 audit ﬁrms, 0 otherwise; CODE_BIG10 = 1 if in top 10 Chinese local audit ﬁrms, 0 otherwise. p-values are one-tailed.
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of Western-style corporate governance systems into Chinese listed ﬁrms may not have been as effective as intended (Cho & Rui,
2009; Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007).
With regard to ownership variables, the coefﬁcient on the association of earnings quality and concentration of ownership
(TOP3) is signiﬁcant and negative, suggesting that ﬁrms with more concentrated ownership will be more likely to be associated
with higher earnings quality. The results also show a negative relationship between the tradability of shares and earnings quality
(coefﬁcient of TRADABLE = −0.0381, p = 0.0105), and ﬁrms audited by the Big 4 have lower discretionary accruals.
6.2. Earnings quality and types of ICW
Regression results for the relationship between different types of ICW and ABSDA are tabulated in Model 5 of Table 4. The
coefﬁcients of two measures: DISWEAK_ACC and DISWEAK_NOACC in Model 5 are signiﬁcantly positive. The coefﬁcient of
DISWEAK_ACC is 0.0068 (p = 0.0649, one-tailed), and the coefﬁcient of DISWEAK_NOACC is 0.0064 (p = 0.0527, one-tailed).
These results indicate that H2a and H2b, in regard to the existence of different types of ICWs, are supported.
One reason that non-accounting-related ICWs can impact earnings quality may be that users regard ICWs in non-accounting-
related areas as leading indicators of problems in the internal control system. These non-accounting related ICWs will eventually
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tentional and unintentional errors. This ﬁnding is further supported by some direct and anecdotal evidence on Chinese ﬁrms' ICRs.
For example, one ﬁrm points out, in its ICR, that “internal control is not efﬁcient and effective due to lack of appropriate stafﬁng.
This will, in turn, affect quality of ﬁnancial reports.” Another ﬁrm states, “to prevent the accounting errors occurred in the ﬁnan-
cial reports, the ﬁrm should further strengthen personnel training for the BOD, Supervisory Board, senior management team as
well as all accountants in relevant departments, with an aim to improving their awareness of the importance of internal control
and essential mechanisms in the internal control system.”
6.3. The impact of severity of ICWs on earnings quality
We have applied two-stage models to examine the association between ICW disclosure and earnings quality. Under the two-
stage models, the measurement of ICW disclosure can only be a dummy variable (DISWEAK). DISWEAK equals 1 when ﬁrms dis-
close ICWs in ICRs, zero otherwise. Since a further question can arise as to what is the relationship between earnings quality and
the seriousness of ICWs, we use a continuous variable of DISSCORE as a measurement of severity of ICWs in Model 6. DISSCORE is
calculated by multiplying the frequencies of ICWs and the three levels of severity of ICW. The three levels of severity of weak-
nesses is coded as 0 – no weakness, 1 – minor weakness, 2 – major weakness, and 3 – serious weakness. The reporting ofTable 5
Relationship between disclosure scores of internal control weaknesses and absolute discretionary accruals.
Dependent variable: ABSDA
Sign
Model 6 Model 6
Independent variables Coeff. t-stats Prob. Coeff. t-stats Prob.
C 0.0981 1.7864 0.0372 0.0981 1.7856 0.0373
DISSCORE + 0.0010 2.0490 0.0204
DISSCORE_ACC + 0.0015 1.1691 0.1213
DISSCORE_NOACC + 0.0008 1.2920 0.0984
ROA + 0.3366 8.9532 0.0000 0.3365 8.9462 0.0000
CFO – −0.1407 −7.2943 0.0000 −0.1408 −7.2928 0.0000
LOSS + 0.0317 3.8815 0.0001 0.0316 3.8661 0.0001
SIZE ? −0.0030 −1.4727 0.0706 −0.0029 −1.4656 0.0716
LEV + 0.0521 4.4583 0.0000 0.0522 4.4649 0.0000
GROWTH ? −0.0079 −3.1053 0.0010 −0.0079 −3.1062 0.0010
RETURN_DEV + 0.0202 0.3477 0.3641 0.0208 0.3562 0.3609
TURNOVER_A + 0.0097 0.6689 0.2519 0.0098 0.6759 0.2497
TURNOVER_I + 0.0024 2.1224 0.0170 0.0024 2.1152 0.0174
AGE ? 0.0005 0.9610 0.1684 0.0005 0.9609 0.1684
BRDSIZE ? −0.0045 −0.4415 0.3295 −0.0045 −0.4368 0.3312
BRDIND – 0.0366 1.1362 0.1281 0.0371 1.1508 0.1251
SUPERSIZE ? −0.0095 −1.5242 0.0639 −0.0095 −1.5321 0.0629
SUPERIND – −0.0001 −0.0172 0.4932 −0.0002 −0.0261 0.4896
DUALITY + 0.0003 0.0634 0.4748 0.0003 0.0561 0.4777
AC_EXP – 0.0011 0.1653 0.4344 0.0010 0.1528 0.4393
POLICON + 0.0000 −0.0041 0.4984 0.0000 −0.0055 0.4978
TOP3 + 0.0075 0.4544 0.3249 0.0074 0.4512 0.3260
CODE_STATE + −0.0007 −0.1572 0.4376 −0.0007 −0.1591 0.4368
TRADABLE – −0.0072 −0.8296 0.2035 −0.0074 −0.8507 0.1976
INSTITUTE – −0.0272 −1.0946 0.1370 −0.0269 −1.0815 0.1399
CODE_BIG4 – −0.0063 −0.9056 0.1827 −0.0061 −0.8866 0.1878
CODE_BIG10 – −0.0057 −1.5456 0.0613 −0.0057 −1.5509 0.0606
Industries Yes Yes
Years Yes Yes
R-squared 0.2124 0.2125
Adjusted R-squared 0.1790 0.1783
F-statistic 6.3639 6.2180
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.8550 1.8537
Observation 1059 1059
ABSDA = absolute discretional accruals; DISSCORE = multiplying the number of ICWs with severity of weakness, the severity of ICWs is coded 0 – no
weakness, 1 – minor weakness, 2 – major weakness, and 3 – serious weakness; ROA = return on assets; CFO = cash ﬂow from operating activities; LOSS = loss
making; SIZE = logarithm of total assets; LEV = total liability divided by total assets; GROWTH = changes in sales revenues divided by sales revenue;
RETURN_DEV = standard deviation of monthly returns over the 12 months of the ﬁnancial year; TURNOVER_A = total accounts receivable divided by total
sales revenue; TURNOVER_I = total inventory divided by total costs of goods sold; AGE = number of years ﬁrms have operated. BRDSIZE = logarithm of the
number of directors on the BOD; BRDIND = percentage of independent directors on the BOD; SUPERSIZE = logarithm of the number of supervisors on the
supervisory board; SUPERIND = percentage of the number of non-paid supervisors on the supervisory board; DUALITY = 1 if a CEO is also the chairperson of
the BOD, 0 otherwise; AC_EXP is percentage of members with accounting, ﬁnance, or economic background in audit committee; POLICON equals 1 if CEO or
chairman of BOD is or was a representative of the National People's Congress, a government ofﬁcial, or military ofﬁcer, 0 otherwise; TOP3 = percentage of top
three shareholders' ownership interests in the ﬁrms; CODE_STATE = 1 if the ﬁrm is a state-controlled ﬁrm, 0 otherwise; TRADABLE = percentage of shares
that can be traded without any restrictions; INSTITUTE = percentage of shares held by management funds; CODE_BIG4 = if Big 4 audit ﬁrm, 0 otherwise;
CODE_BIG10 = 1 if top 10 Chinese local audit ﬁrm, 0 otherwise. p-values are one-tailed.
42 X. Ji et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 52 (2017) 27–44three levels—minor, major, and serious—of ICW severity is required by the Basic Standard and assessed based on the Internal Con-
trol Evaluation Guidelines.ABSDAit ¼ α1 þ ϕ1DISSCOREit þ β1ROAit þ β2CFOit þ β3LOSSit þ β4SIZEit þ β5LEVit þ β6GROWTHit
þβ7RETURN DEVit þ β8TURNOVER Ait þ β9TURNOVER Iit þ β10AGEit þ β11BRDSIZEitþ
β12BRDINDit þ β13SUPERSIZEit þ β14SUPERINDit þ β15DUALITYit þ β16AC EXPitþ
þβ17POLICON17 þ β18TOP3it þ β19CODE STATEit þ β20TRADABLEitþ
β21INSTITUTEit þ β22CODE BIG4it þ β23CODE BIGLOCAL10it
þ∑
18
j¼1
γ jINDit þ φ1Y2010it þ εit
ð6ÞIn line with our investigation on earnings quality and types of ICW in Section 6.2, we further divide DISSCORE into DISSCORE_
ACC and DISSCORE_ NONACC in Model 6 to test whether the severity of accounting-related or non-accounting-related ICWs
affects earnings quality. DISSCORE_ACC is the sum of the accounting-related ICW scores, while DISSCORE_NONACC is the sum of
non-accounting-related ICW scores. The results of our tests are presented in Table 5.
According to Table 5, the coefﬁcient of DISSCORE in Model 6 is positively and signiﬁcantly related to ABSDA (coefﬁcient =
0.0010 and p = 0.0204, one-tailed). This result demonstrates that the more severe the ICWs disclosed, the higher the ABSDA.
This evidence further supports H1 that earnings quality is associated with disclosure of ICWs. The impacts of the severity of
both accounting-related and non-accounting-related ICWs on ABSDA are also shown in Table 5. It shows that only the severity
of non-accounting-related ICWs is positively and signiﬁcantly related to ABSDA. These results further support H2b.
6.4. Robustness tests
Estimation of discretionary accruals is a difﬁcult task for accounting academics. Since Jones (1991), there have been many
alternative models suggested based on the Jones model. Among these, the modiﬁed Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), the
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, in which current accruals are regressed on cash ﬂows, and the Kothari et al. (2005) model
are the most popular. The Kothari model is chosen as the main estimation model of discretionary accruals in our study. In our
ﬁrst robustness test, we also use the Jones model and the modiﬁed Jones model to re-estimate discretionary accruals, and then
test them against the ICWs disclosed and/or measures of political connection. The results are similar to those obtained using
the Kothari et al. (2005) model, as reported in previous parts of Section 6.
We also reclassify non-accounting-related ICWs by excluding non-speciﬁed items and recalculating non-accounting-
related ICW scores accordingly. The empirical results still show a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between the disclosure of
non-accounting-related ICWs (measured in both the dummy variable of DISWEAK_NOACC and the continuous variable of
DISSCORE_NOACC) and earnings quality.
In our last robustness test, we further investigate whether earnings quality differs between ﬁrms that have and those that have
not had their ICRs audited. In our sample, 32.5% of ﬁrms choose to have their ICRs audited (Table 2, Panel A); it is interesting to
see whether there are differences between the two groups. Our results show that having ICRs audited can mitigate relationship
between earnings quality and the severity of non-accounting-related ICWs (the results are not tabulated, but are available on
request).
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between voluntary disclosure of ICWs and earnings quality in the unique environment
of China. We ﬁnd that internal control is an effective tool for controlling enterprise risks, and earnings quality, measured as the
ABSDA, is positively related to the disclosures of ICWs. The more ICWs disclosed, the higher the value of ABSDA. In terms of
different types of weakness (accounting-related versus non-accounting-related ICWs), our results demonstrate that earnings
quality is signiﬁcantly associated with disclosures of both accounting-related and non-accounting-related ICWs. These ﬁndings
should be of particular interest to regulators in the United States and around the world. Our results provide strong supporting
evidence to the current debate on whether the requirement for management and the auditor to evaluate internal control over
ﬁnancial reporting under SOX should be expanded to non-accounting-related areas.
Our research provides a valuable and timely study on the likely outcomes of implementing SOX-type regulations, that is, the
Basic Standard, in China from 2012. Since 1978 when China carried out its economic reforms and implemented an “open door”
policy, the Chinese economy has grown rapidly, at an annual growth rate of 10%, and has been integrated into the global
economy. Many Western systems have been introduced into China over recent years. Some of them have been well adopted,
while others are not so well blended into the institutional environment of China. Some of these systems are said to be adopted
in form only, and not in substance, such as the corporate governance system (Firth et al., 2007). In this paper, we examine the
impact of the introduction of internal control reporting in China. Our initial assessment of this reform proves to be positive,
implying that internal control reporting has the potential to be well integrated into Chinese listed ﬁrms.
The implementation of the Basic Standard provides many research opportunities. Ours is only an initial and overall assessment
of internal control reporting in a voluntary regime in the Chinese setting. There are still many questions that must be answered.
For example, what are the differences in ICW disclosure behaviors between voluntary and compulsory regimes since China made
43X. Ji et al. / The International Journal of Accounting 52 (2017) 27–44internal control reporting compulsory from 2012? Are there any signiﬁcant improvements in ﬁrms' internal control, including in
accounting and non-accounting-related areas, since the Basic Standard was introduced? And if there are improvements, what are
the effects on earnings quality? Finally, what are the impacts of accounting and non-accounting-related ICWs on audit fees?
Overall, our results show that ICW disclosure in China indeed provides additional useful information to users. Internal control
reporting is not a “window dressing” activity; rather, it is an alternative indicator of earnings quality. Our ﬁndings have signiﬁcant
implications for market regulators such as the CSRC. First, ICRs are necessary alongside traditional ﬁnancial statements even
though China has a different political, economic, and cultural environment and hence constitutes a different information
õenvironment (Piotroski & Wong, 2011). Second, internal control reporting is an effective vehicle; not only can it improve the
quality of ﬁnancial reporting, but it can also strengthen its internal management, such as preventing fraud and embezzlement.
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